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Universally Composable
RFID Mutual Authentication
Chunhua Su, Bagus Santoso, Yingjiu Li, Robert H. Deng, and Xinyi Huang
Abstract—Universally Composable (UC) framework provides the strongest security notion for designing fully trusted cryptographic
protocols, and it is very challenging on applying UC security in the design of RFID mutual authentication protocols. In this paper, we
formulate the necessary conditions for achieving UC secure RFID mutual authentication protocols which can be fully trusted in arbitrary
environment, and indicate the inadequacy of some existing schemes under the UC framework. We define the ideal functionality for
RFID mutual authentication and propose the first UC secure RFID mutual authentication protocol based on public key encryption and
certain trusted third parties which can be modeled as functionalities. We prove the security of our protocol under the strongest
adversary model assuming both the tags’ and readers’ corruptions. We also present two (public) key update protocols for the cases of
multiple readers: one uses Message Authentication Code (MAC) and the other uses trusted certificates in Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). Furthermore, we address the relations between our UC framework and the zero-knowledge privacy model proposed by Deng et
al. [1].
Index Terms—cryptographic protocol, RFID authentication, universal composability.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
RFID reader/tag mutual authentication is a major theme in RFID
security and privacy research. It requires that an RFID tag authen-
ticate itself to a reader and that the reader authenticate itself to
the tag such that they are assured of each other’s identities. In this
paper, we focus on RFID mutual authentication protocols within
the Universally Composable (UC) framework. Cryptographic pro-
tocols that are secure in the UC framework guarantee that the
protocols remain secure even when composed concurrently with
an unbounded number of instances of arbitrary protocols. This
is known as the strongest (computational) security model for
cryptographic protocols. A protocol which is secure under the
UC-framework can thus be used to construct a fully trusted
functionality under arbitrary protocol composition.
1.1 Related Work and Challenging Issue
The research in RFID security and privacy, especially RFID
authentication protocols, is updating rapidly. Most of RFID au-
thentication protocols can be classified into two approaches.
One approach is based on symmetric-key techniques such as
PRNGs, hash functions and block ciphers. Two typical works of
this approach are the hash-lock based scheme [2] and the OSK
scheme based on hash chain [3]. The other approach is based
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on public key techniques. For examples, Tuyls et al. proposed
a scheme based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [4] and
Vaudeney et al. proposed schemes based on certain CCA secure
public key encryption [5, 6]. The public key based approach may
provide stronger privacy guarantees than the symmetric-key based
approach in the case of adversary making the corruption of tags
and getting their internal states [5, 6].
The security model of RFID authentication protocols is an-
other important issue. Avoine [7] first formalized an adversary
model in RFID systems. Based on the adversary model, Juels and
Weis defined the notion of strong privacy for analysing the privacy
issues in RFID systems [8]. The security definitions in the existing
works [7, 8, 9, 6] for RFID authentication protocols are built on
the traditional game-based security model. The model first sets the
goal of an adversary in RFID authentication, that is, under which
conditions the adversary can win; then it models the adversary’s
attack as a series of queries to some oracles which model the
execution of the protocol. The RFID protocol is proved to be
secure if the probability of the adversary’s success is negligible.
The most related works to ours are the forward formalization
of privacy model for RFID systems[10, 11], which present certain
RFID authentication protocols and authenticated key-exchange
protocols in the UC framework. However, there are still some
unclear points in their schemes and it is necessary to provide
more concrete security analysis (See Section 3). Furthermore,
they only consider the corruption of RFID tags, while in the
UC framework, all parties’ corruption should be considered. It
is thus important for us to formulate the necessary conditions for
designing a UC secure RFID mutual authentication scheme and
implementing such scheme.
Challenging Issue. The RFID protocols in the related works
are secure under the traditional stand-alone model. When those
protocols are used in the concurrent way or being composed with
other instances of the same or other protocols, they may not be
secure anymore. The UC-framework guarantees that a provably
secure protocol remains secure no matter it is used as a sub-
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protocol or as an independent protocol. When designing a UC
secure RFID authentication protocol, one should not only model
an attacker’s behavior but also provide a comprehensive security
proof by comparing the executions of two protocol processes, a
real process and an ideal process. Furthermore, in the UC-secure
framework, one should model both tag and reader’s corruptions.
All of these requirements pose a significant challenge in protocol
design and analysis which has not been fully addressed before.
1.2 Our Contributions and Organization
In this paper, we target at UC-secure RFID mutual authentication.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We provide a stronger security framework for RFID mu-
tual authentication protocol and define an ideal function-
ality to model the protocol and the adversary’s behavior.
We work out two ideal functionalities for authenticated
key update. Furthermore, we prove that it is impossible
to implement UC secure RFID mutual authentication
protocol under the plain model (without any extra as-
sumptions) and make further analysis on Le et al.’s UC
secure protocols [10, 11].
2) We modify the public key encryption-based authenti-
cation protocols proposed in [5, 6] into a UC secure
mutual authentication protocol. We construct our UC
secure protocol based on the common reference string
(CRS) which is used to generate a common public key
for both reader and tag. Due to the pure theoretical flavor
of the UC security framework, we provide certain opti-
mized practical solutions to reduce the communication
overhead.
3) We rely on PKI functionality to maintain trusted rela-
tionship between reader and tag which involves a trusted
third party issuing certification for a legitimate reader
to update the public keys in RFID tags as requested in
RFID enabled supply chain management. For updating
the readers’ public keys, we propose two UC-secure key
update protocols, of which one is based on Message Au-
thentication Code (MAC) and the other relies on public
key certificates in PKI.
4) We refine our preliminary result on the Universal Com-
posable RFID mutual authentication scheme at RFID
Sec’ 11 Asia and provide a proof that the refined UC-
secure RFID mutual authentication scheme satisfies the
ZK-privacy proposed by Deng et al. at ESORICS 2010.
The organization of this paper. In the next section, we introduce
the basic components for RFID mutual authentication and make a
comparison between the traditional security model and our model,
followed by the formal definition of universal composability
framework. In Section 3, we model the functionalities of RFID
mutual authentication and authenticated public key update, and
show that designing a UC secure protocol for the implementation
of an ideal RFID mutual authentication functionality in the plain
model is non-trivial. In Section 4, we present our implementations
of UC secure protocols for RFID mutual authentication as well as
authenticated public key update, together with certain optimized
solutions on reducing the communication cost. In Section 5,
we provide the security proofs of our protocols under the UC
framework. In Section 6, we make a comparison between the
well-known ZK-privacy model and our UC-model. At last, we
draw conclusions.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first give a brief description about RFID mutual
authentication protocol, and then we compare the traditional
game-based security model with simulation-based security model
in UC-framework. After that, we introduce the security definitions
in UC-framework, which shall consist of two definitions: firstly,
it must specify how an arbitrary, probabilistic, polynomial-time
adversary can interact with legitimate participants of a protocol;
and secondly, it must state what the adversary should achieve in
order to break the security of the protocol.
2.1 RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol
As a malicious reader could obtain unauthorized information from
a tag during the tag authentication, so it is an important issue of
authenticating the reader as well. As a countermeasure, Tsudik
[12] proposed the YA-TRIP and YA-TRAP schemes based on
timestamps to do the mutual authentication. An RFID mutual
authentication scheme is such that the output is correct except
with a negligible probability, it can be described as follows.
1) Initiate a reader R with certain keys for verifying tags’
identities.
2) Create a set of tags, each tag Ti having a unique IDi.
3) Execute a complete protocol between the reader R and a
tag Ti, output the tag’s IDi to the reader and verify the
reader to the tag.
Here, the reader may have real-time access to a database so as
to identify a tag’s ID.
There are two general models to formalize the security of
interactive protocols: the game-based model and the simulation-
based model. Game-based security model used in [9, 5, 6] has
the advantages of easy-to-understand and simple-to-apply in the
formalization of RFID authentication protocols. Unfortunately,
such game-based security modes cannot be used to analyze the
security of an RFID protocol when it is used as a sub-protocol in
a composite setting.
We want to have an RFID Mutual Authentication with the
following properties:
• Completeness: For any good tag and a good reader, in a
good session of authentication, both tag and the reader
accept each other.
• Soundness (Security against Impersonation): No good
reader accepts a bad tag and no good tag accepts a bad
reader in a good session of authentication. In a bad session,
no good reader accepts a tag (regardless good or bad), and
no good tag accepts a reader (regardless good or bad).
• Privacy: No information about a good tag is revealed in
an authentication session (regardless good session or bad
session).
2.2 Security Definition of UC Framework
A protocol that is secure within the framework [13, 14] proposed
by Canetti is called universally composable (UC). We say that the
protocol UC realizes the given functionality. In UC framework,
a computationally limited entity called the environment Z has to
distinguish between an execution of the protocol with adversary
A and an execution of an ideal functionality with simulator S .
We then say that a protocol pi realizes an ideal functionality F
if there exists a simulator S which given access to F can simulate
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a run of pi with the same input-output behavior. In doing so, S
is given the inputs of the corrupted parties, and the information
leaked on the execution of F , and can specify the inputs of
corrupted parties. Let IDEALF,S,Z and REALpi,A,Z denote
the view of environment Z in ideal world model and real world
model, respectively. For any environment Z , it holds:
IDEALF,S,Z ≡ REALpi,A,Z (1)
A protocol that is secure under UC-framework can be run in
a network where many different and arbitrary protocols are being
executed. F expects each incoming message to contain a special
field consisting of its session ID (SID). That is, each call to a copy
of F and each response from this copy should hold the SID of
that copy.
Fig. 1. The UC model of RFID Mutual Authentication
The Adversarial Power. In the UC RFID model, the adversary
can corrupt and take full control of RFID tags and reader at will.
The corruption strategy deals with the questions of when and how
parties are corrupted. There are two main kinds of corruption:
 Static corruption: The adversary is given a fixed set of
RFID tags or readers of which it controls. Uncorrupted
parties remain honest and corrupted parties remain cor-
rupted throughout the protocol runs.
 Adaptive corruption: Different from the static corruption,
adaptive adversaries are given the capability of corrupting
RFID tags or readers during the mutual authentication.
The choice of which one to corrupt, and when, can be
arbitrarily decided by the adversary and may depend on
its view of the execution.
In this paper we deal with the static corruptions of RFID
tags and readers assuming all the adversaries have polynomial
computation capability.
3 THE FUNCTIONALITY OF RFID MUTUAL AU-
THENTICATION AND IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
Generally, the UC frameworl is a security assessment where
security is defined by simulation of an ideal process and it is
the assurance of secure composition with arbitrary protocol. In
Canetti et al. [15], the author provide some examples such as of
security failures in multiple protocol execution for ZK-knowledge
proof or bit commitment. For the mutual RFID authentication in
this paper, reader interacts with a tag in two sessions or two tags
in one session concurrently. Then there is a potential attack as
follows for the three round RFID authentication:
1) Reader sends two challenges c1 and c2 to and obtains the
authentication corresponds r1 from tag in session 1.
2) Reader sends a responce of r1 as it is responce for r2 in
session 2, gets a successful authenticated in the last round
with.
3) Then, reader do similarly to tag in session 1, and obtains
some additional secret information inside a tag according
the protocol specific design.
So we can see that running two instances of the same protocol
in parallel is not secure, the similar security risk also applies to a
read interacts with two tags concurrently. The security proof is the
construction of the simulator, usually, a black box simulator.
3.1 The Ideal Functionality for RFID Mutual Authentica-
tion
To properly design a functionality which can model the mutual
authentication and the adversary behavior is a very critical before
building a excellent implementation. The functionality must model
the adversary’s attack and what kind of messages the adversary can
use. For an ideal functionality, we have to consider the simulator’s
action inside the ideal functionality and follow three principles as
follows.
1) The functionality should capture simulator’s affection in
the communication between RFID tags and reader in the
ideal world. Simulator can be considered as an adversary
in the ideal world.
2) The event of communication between two parties is
allowed to be informed to the simulator. In the real
world model, the message transferred between two parties
maybe not be revealed to an adversary due to the security
of the encryption system, however, the adversary can
know that communication between two parties is going
on.
3) The simulator can delay the timing of message trans-
mission. In the real world model, the communication
channel can be controlled by the adversary. So in the
ideal functionality, the simulator also do the same and
delay the message output.
Here, we define the ideal functionality of RFID mutual authen-
tication FRMA in Fig.2. Note that one functionality is correspond
to one session id sid.
The InitReader and InitTag procedures can be included in
the Setup procedure of real RFID mutual authentication scheme.
FRMA is design to guarantees the following security against
any static adversary as follows:
• Correctness: any tag and a reader who posses internal
data satisfying the relation will get accepted unless the
adversary stop the authentication process.
• Security against Impersonation: no tag/reader with internal
data not satisfying the relation get accepted. Since in UC
framework authentication result always delivered to the
correct parties, a Man-In-the-Middle adversary can not
make a tag (corrupted or non corrupted) be authenticated
and accepted as a different tag.
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The Functionality of RFID Mutual Authentication
The functionality FRMA is parameterized by a security pa-
rameter k and a relation R. It interacts with an adversary S
and a set of RFID tags and a reader.
1) Upon receiving a value (InitReader, sid, R,
u) from some party R, if no party is recorded the
"reader", record R as the "reader", store (R, u) to
database, and send (InitReader, sid) to adver-
sary. Else, ignore the value.
2) Upon receiving a value (InitTag, sid,
R, Ti, IDi, vi) from some party Ti, if R is recorded
as the "reader" and there is no record (R, Ti, ID, v)
with any values of ID′, v′ in the database, store
(R, Ti, IDi, vi) and send (InitTag, sid) to
adversary. Else, ignore the value.
3) Upon receiving a message (Authenticate,
sid, R, Ti) from R or Ti, if (R, u) and
(R, Ti, IDi, vi) for some value u, IDi, and
vi are recorded in the database, proceed as
below. Otherwise, ignore the message. Gener-
ate a random value ri ∈ {0, 1}k and send
(Authenticate, sid, ri,R(u, vi)) to the ad-
versary.
3.1 If S returns (Both, sid, ri) and
R(u, vi) = 1, send (Result, sid, IDi) to
R and (Result, sid, "accept") to Ti,
otherwise send (Result, sid, "reject") to
R and Ti.
3.2 If S returns (ReaderAuthOnly, sid,ri)
and R(u, vi) = 1 , send
(Result, sid, "accept") to Ti, otherwise
send (Result, sid, "reject") to Ti. If
adversary returns (TagAuthOnly, sid, ri), if
R(u, vi) = 1 send (Result, sid,IDi) to R,
otherwise send (Result, sid, "reject") to
R.
Fig. 2. The ideal functionality of RFID mutual authentication, FRMA
• Anonymity: as long as the number of uncorrupted tag is
more than one, adversary does not know which uncor-
rupted tag is being authenticated.
• Wide privacy: although the result of authentication is
available to adversary, the adversary can not link the
information to any tag unless it corrupts the corresponding
tag.
The random value generated in Authenticate serves as the
unique identifier for the message to give adversary privilege to
delay or to halt the authentication process between the reader
and the tag. We allow the adversary to delay or to halt the
authentication process partially on one side of the party, e.g., only
tag receives the authentication result but the reader does not, as
this kind of attack (cut-off-message attack) can not be prevented
[1]. The InitReader and InitTag procedures can be included in the
Setup procedure of real RFID mutual authentication scheme.
We also consider RFID mutual authentication protocol where
the new-joining readers want to update their public keys or
authentication related keys into each tag and where the keys are
needed to be updated after each authentication for security. We
give out the ideal functionality for the key updating operations in
Figure 3.
The Functionality of Authenticated Key Update
The functionality FKeyUpdate interacts with an adversary S
and a set of RFID tags and some readers.
1) Upon receiving the first message
(RegisterKey, sid,KP , idenR) from reader
R, send (Registered, sid,KP ) to the S; upon
receiving ok from S , and if sid is correct and this
is the first request from R, then record the pair
(RegisterKey, R, idenR,KP ).
2) Upon receiving a message
(Update, sid, Ti, idenR) from reader R, send
(Update, sid, Ti) to S . After receiving an ok
from S and if there is a recorded pair (sid, Ti),
output (NewKey, sid,KP ) to tag Ti. Else output
nothing.
Fig. 3. The ideal functionality of key update, FKeyUpdate
3.2 Impossibility Result
In this section, we show that the FRMA functionality cannot
be securely realized in the plain model without using additional
cryptographic primitives like a common random string. Canetti et
al. show broad impossibility results by demonstrating that large
classes of two-party functionalities cannot be UC realized in the
plain model [16]. The results indicate the security proof problems
in the design of existing RFID mutual authentication protocols
claimed to be UC secure.
Here, we show that the impossibility result refers to non-trivial
protocols, a non-trivial protocol has the property that if the real
world adversary delivers all messages and does not corrupt any
parties, then the ideal world adversary also delivers all messages
(and does not corrupt any parties). Both the reader and the tag are
ensured to pass the mutual authentication verifications at the end of
a protocol execution (except perhaps with negligible probability),
provided that (1) both the reader and the tag use some keys or
randomness which satisfy a certain relation; and (2) the adversary
passes all messages between reader and tags without modifying
them or inserting any message of its own.
Theorem 1. There does not exist a non-trivial protocol pi that
securely realizes the functionality FRMA in the plain model.
Proof: Here, we can model all parties as Turing machine.
Initially, the environment needs to provide the same inputs to
the readers and the tags in the real world model and in the
ideal world model. In the real world model, A can corrupt the
tags executing the RFID mutual authentication, also A would
eavesdrop the communication between the readers and the tags
and sends it back to the environment Z . In the ideal world, there is
a simulator S which interacts with the ideal functionality FRMA.
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S can simulate what A has seen in the real world and report the
simulated messages to Z .
It is not required that ideal adversary to deliver messages
which are sent by the ideal functionality to the dummy parties.
Our definition concentrates on the security requirements in the
case that the protocol generates output, then ?When dummy party
receives an input from Z , the input will be copied to the input tape
of ideal functionality. Simulator S has to simulate the output of
functionality FRMA without knowing the input copied to FRMA.
• Every input value S received from Z is written on A’s
input-tape (as if coming fromA’s environment). Likewise,
every output value written by A on its own output-tape
is copied to S’s own output-tape (to be read by S’s
environment Z).
• When a tag or a reader is corrupted by the adversary in the
real world execution, S shall simulate the corruption in
the ideal world. Intuitively, it is difficult for S to provide a
simulation for Z since S must send the correct identifiers
of the reader and tags to FRMA, while the only way of
obtaining information about identifier is through a real
execution of the protocol with Z . The simulator must be
able to extract the identifiers of the reader and tags from
the messages seen by the adversary in the real world.
If there is a match conversation between a tag and a reader
(the identities of the tag and the reader match) in the au-
thentication of both real world and ideal world, Z outputs 1,
otherwise Z outputs 0. When there is no match conversation,
Pr[Z outputs 0|R = (U, V ) 6= 1 in real world] = 1 − negl(k),
where negl(k) is a negligible function, and Pr[Z outputs 0|R =
(U, V ) 6= 1 in ideal world] = 1 − negl(k). It is difficult for
S to provide a correct simulation for Z since S must send
correct identities of both the tag and the reader, while its only
way of obtaining such information is through a real authentication
execution of the protocol with Z . so S can simulate the output of
0 with the probability with 1/2+negl(k).
The non-trivial requirement is necessary since an protocol
where no reader and tags can do anything on securely realizing
the ideal functionality (note that in the ideal model, the simulator
can never generate correct identifiers to the functionality). So we
can claim the theorem above.
Analysis of Existing Schemes in UC Framework: RFID
mutual authentication schemes under UC-framework are proposed
in [10, 11]. They assume the existence of anonymous chan-
nels for that RFID security protocol and represent it using the
ideal anonymous communication functionalityFcom. However,
the above result on the non-trivial requirement indicates some
incompleteness of security proof in the scheme of [10, 11],
whose security proof is without the extractability of during the
RFID authentication communication. In UC security framework
for RFID authentication, the environment Z can be model as
probabilistic polynomial turing machine and its tapes are not
copied to both adversary A and simulator S . The environment
Z generates all the inputs and sends them to the real tags and
reader of real world and dummy tags and reader in both real work
and ideal world.
Here we provide a brief analysis as follows:
1) In the security proof of [10], it is assumed that there is
a trusted server which is modeled as an oracle OS and
creates a database of keys Ki, i = 1, ..., n. The simulator
can access the oracles in the ideal world simulation,
however, in UC security model, the simulator should
simulate all the oracles without interaction with them.
2) As in the authentication of [10, 11], both the reader and
the tags have secret states during the protocol execution.
In UC-framework, rtag , ktag are provided by Z . In their
proposal, they are encrypted by a pseudo-random func-
tion F , obviously, the simulator S can not extract rtag ,
ktag from the messages transferred between the tags and
the reader. F () should be a extractable function which
allows the simulator to extract the identified information.
For the session IDs sidi and sidj , the environment Z
easily distinguish if simulator S fail to simulate the same
results of the authentication.
Due to the one-wayness of pseudo-random function, it is
impossible to be used to implement a UC secure RFID protocol.
So in this paper, we use public key encryption to achieve the
extractability and the requirements of UC security.
4 OUR IMPLEMENTATIONS OF UC SECURE MU-
TUAL AUTHENTICATION
On designing a UC secure protocol, we have to provide a relatively
general and minimal assumption that can be realized by a number
of quite different and alternative "set-up mechanisms". Here, the
common reference string (CRS) model is used in our protocol.
In this model, originally proposed in [17], all parties have access
to a common string r that was ideally drawn from some publicly
known distribution. It acts as a trusted third party which allows
parties to register their identities together with an associated public
key.
Tag t
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Fig. 4. The sketch of our protocol
4.1 UC Secure Mutual Authentication Protocol for RFID
We first consider an RFID system comprising of a single legitimate
reader R and a set of RFID tags T1, ..., Tn. The reader and the
tags are probabilistic polynomial time Turing interactive machine.
Typically, each tag is a passive transponder identified by a unique
ID and has only limited memory which can be used to store only
several keys and/or state information. We modify the protocol
from Paise and Vaudenay’s scheme [5] based on a CCA-secure
Public Key Cryptosystem (PKC). A PKC includes a key gener-
ator, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption algorithm. The
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correctness of a PKC ensures that the decryption of the encryption
of any x is always x. The scheme is CCA-secure if all polynomial-
time adversaries win the CCA game with negligible advantage. To
achieve the extractability, both the reader and the tags use the same
public key generated by CRS, which is the minimum condition on
the realization of UC secure RFID authentication protocols.
The main issue is that an ideal-model simulator must be able
to extract the identifiers from the adversary’s input. So we let
the reader generate the random challenge as a ciphertext a which
contains KS and KM . Here, the message d is not sent for verifi-
cation by the reader but for the simulator to extract KS so that the
protocol can be proved secure under UC-framework. A simulator
knowing the associated decryption key can decrypt and obtain the
information which is used in the ideal functionality. Note that for
a UC protocol, the input is provided by the environment Z . We
give a more detailed description of protocol execution in Figure5:
UC Secure RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol piRMA
Common reference string: A pk is generated as a common
reference string, where pk is a public key for a CCA-secure
encryption scheme Enc.
1) Initially, the environment Z provides both the tag
and the reader with initial states as the inputs for
mutual authentication. The reader installs key pair
KP ,KS ,KM and the tag Ti installs KP . The
reader uses a pseudorandom function F and gen-
erates FKM (IDi) = Ki.
2) Upon receiving (InitReader, sid,KP ,KS ,KM ),
the reader computes a = Encpk(KS ||KM ), after
that the reader sends (Challenge, sid, a) to the
tag Ti.
3) Upon receiving (InitTag, sid,KP , IDi,Ki), the
tag Ti generates a random nonce b ∈ {0, 1}n
and computes c = EncKP (IDi||Ki||a||b) and
d = Encpk(a). Then the tag Ti sends
(TagIden, sid, c, d) to the reader.
4) After receiving c, d, the reader computes DecKS (c)
and parses IDi||Ki||a′||b′; if a′ = a and
FKM (IDi) = Ki, outputs IDi; if not, randomly
sets b′ ∈ {0, 1}n.
5) The reader sends (TagRandom, sid, b′) to the tag
Ti. The tag checks that whether b = b′; if yes, the
reader is authenticated.
Fig. 5. UC Secure RFID Mutual Authentication Protocol, piRMA
All tags and readers are connected through point-to-point com-
munication channels. The channels are public, i.e., the adversary
A can read all data transmitted between all parties. The adversary
is also responsible for delivering messages.
Optimized Implementations for Achieving Communication Ef-
ficiency: For an RFID authentication protocol, the communication
of the protocol is the most time-consuming part compared to other
tasks such as random number generation, encryption and authen-
tication verification. We can use Elliptic Curve Cryptography as
the building block of our protocol without any other cryptographic
primitives. The first challenge a which is sent by the reader is a
ciphertext with ECC encryption. The challenge could be 300-bit
long for the reduction on communication overhead. IDi could be
chosen as 96 bits and Ki be 128 bits. Assuming the reader has
real-time access to the database, it can search for the matched pair
(IDi,Ki) in the database. Thus the size of the response message
c from the tag can be further reduced as c = EncKP (Ki||a||b).
4.2 UC Secure Protocol for RFID Public Key Update
We have already proposed a UC secure protocol for RFID mutual
authentication without key update above, hereby we deal with the
situations on updating the public keys in the cases of multiple
readers. We focus on how to update the tags’ keys for further
authentication to other readers. The security against relay attack
relies on the uniqueness of the session-identifier for each instance
of the protocol.
(1) Multiple readers’ public key update with message authen-
tication code.
We assume that key update is executed during the reader’s
authentication to the tag. Here we apply Message Authentication
Code (MAC) which is sometimes called a keyed (cryptographic)
hash function. The MAC algorithm computes with a secret key
and an arbitrary-length message to be authenticated, and outputs
a MAC value. The MAC value protects both a message’s data
integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing verifiers to detect
any change to the message content. Any computationally bounded
adversary cannot construct a new legal pair (m;MACk(m)),
even after seeing n legal pairs (mi;MACk(mi)) where i =
1, 2, ..., n, except with negligible probability (Fig.6).
UC Secure Protocol for Public Key Update with MAC
Note that this protocol shares the same sid with the corre-
sponding piRMA
1) If a tag Ti is authenticated, the reader computes e =
MACKi(b
′,K ′P ), where b
′ is received from the tag
Ti in piRMA, and K ′P is a new public key of the
reader.
2) The reader sends (KeyUpdate, sid,K ′P , e) to the
tag Ti. Ti checks whether e = MACKi(b
′,K ′P ),
if yes, Ti updates the public key as KP = K ′P .
Fig. 6. UC Secure Protocol for Authenticated Public Key Update with
MAC
(2) Multiple readers’ public key update with certification.
To realize key update in ubiquitous RFID environments, where
readers do not know each other beforehand, we can rely on a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for updating multiple readers’
public keys with certification. In our model, the certificates from
readers hand over their trust element to CA instead of proving
the authenticity of digital certificate. Once tags are assured that
CA you are dealing with is trust worthy indirectly tags trust
in every other certificate the CA guarantees for. In Canetti et
al.’s [18], a similar UC message authentication protocol based
on Certification Authority (CA) is proposed. It first formulates
an ideal functionality, FCert, that provides the ideal binding of
messages to party identities, then it realizes FCert using the
signature scheme. In our protocol, we modify it in FCert-hybrid
model to construction our UC secure key update protocol for
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multiple readers. Here, we describe the ideal functionality of
certification as follows (Fig.7):
Functionality of Certification FCert
Signature Generation: Upon receiving a value
(Sign, sid,m) from reader R, verify that sid = (R, sid′)
where sid′ is valid session ID. If verification successes,
send (Sign, sid,m) to adversary S . Upon receiving
(Signature, sid,m, σ) from the S , verify that no entry
(m,σ, 0) recorded. Then output an error message to S and
halt. Else, output (Signature, sid,m, σ) to S , and record
the entry (m,σ, 1).
Signature Verification: Upon receiving a value
(Verify, sid,m, σ) from some tag Ti, hand
(Verify, sid,m, σ) to the S . Upon receiving
(Verified, sid,m, φ) from the S , do:
1) If (m,σ, 1) is recorded then set f = 1.
2) Else, if the reader is not corrupted, and no entry
(m,σ′, 1) for any σ′ is recorded, then set f = 0
and record the entry (m,σ, 0). Else, if there is an
entry (m,σ, f ′) recorded, then set f = f ′. Else, set
f = φ, and record the entry (m,σ′, φ).
Output (Verified, sid,m, f) to Ti.
Fig. 7. Functionality of Certification FCert
The basic idea is to introduce a Certification Authority (CA)
in the RFID system to certify the public keys of those readers.
Thus, the tag is only required to store the public key certificate
of the CA. Whenever the reader wants to update its new public
key to the tag, it signs on the new key and sends it together with
its certificate. The tag verifies both the certificate of the reader
and the signature of the new public key. It accepts the new public
key if the verification succeeds. For more details, we present the
protocol in Fig.8.
Authentication Key Update Protocol with Certification
1) Upon receiving (NewKey,K ′P ,K
′
S), reader R first
sets sid′ = (R, sid) and m = (K ′P , Ti), sends
(Sign, sid′,m) to FCert.
2) Upon receiving the response
(Signed, sid′,m, sig) from FCert, and sends
(KeyUpdate, sid,R,m, sig) to tag Ti.
3) After receiving (KeyUpdate, sid,R,m, sig), the
tag Ti sets sid′ = (R, sid), sets m′ = (K ′P , Ti),
sends (Verify, sid′,m′, sig) to FCert, and ob-
tains a response (Verified, sid′,m′, sig, f). If
f = 1, then Ti updates its public key as K ′P . Else
Ti halts without doing anything.
Fig. 8. UC Secure Protocol for Public Key Update with Certification
After the key update, Ti can run the mutual authentication
protocol with multiple readers. The size of the certificate depends
on the specific use case, for example, a standard X.509 certificate
is 268 bytes or 292 bytes long for the key update protocol. Its
trust model is centralized and hierarchical certificate management
model. The certificate is trusted if the certificate really belongs to
the reader shown on the certificate and it is valid if it is trusted
and in its valid time period and not being revoked.
5 PROOF OF UC SECURITY
Protocol pi is said to securely realize F if for every A there exists
an S such that Z cannot distinguish whether it is in the ideal
world model or in the real world model with any non-negligible
advantage over a random guess. Whenever A corrupts a party, S
corrupts the same dummy party in the ideal process, and provides
A which is activated by S internally with the internal state of
the corrupted party. The environment Z uses a distinguishing
algorithm to distinguish any discrete probability distributions D
and D′ from one sample and computational resource limit t. The
output of Z is 1, if it decides on D, otherwise it is 0.
We give the security proofs of our protocols as follows:
Theorem 2. Protocol piRMA of Fig. 4 UC realizes FRMA in the
FCRS-hybrid model.
Proof. The formal model for testing whether our protocol realizes
the ideal functionality FRMA involves an environment Z that
provides inputs to and obtains outputs from either (a) parties
running a single execution of the protocol, plus an adversary A
that controls some of the parties and all the communication, or (b)
dummy parties that communicate only with FRMA by sending it
their inputs and receiving the outputs, plus a simulator S that also
interacts with FRMA.
At first, the simulator S runs a copy of A, and forwards all
messages from Z to its internal A and reports them back to Z .
The simulator S proceeds as follows.
Simulating the case that neither the reader nor the tag is
corrupted.
In the real world, A can not get any internal state of both
the reader and the tag. For this reason, A can only obtain the
exchanged messages in the communication between the reader and
the tag. In the ideal world, the inputs from Z will be directly sent
to FRMA, so the simulator S has to simulate only the messages
exchanged between the reader and the tag in the real world.
• Before the authentication session, S can generate the keys
and random coins used for both reader and tag before
hand.
• Whenever S receives (ReadIden, sid) from the func-
tionality in the ideal world, it computes a =
Encpk(KS ||KM ) and sends a to its internal adversary
A who interacts with Z as if it is the A in the real
world. Note that KS ,KM are selected by S , and Z can
not distinguish whether a is generated in the real world
or in the ideal world due to the property of CCA-secure
encryption.
• Whenever S receives (TagIden, sid) from the func-
tionality in the ideal world, it generates the key of the
tag Ti and computes c = EncKP (IDi||Ki||a||b) and
d = Encpk(a) and sends them to the internal A. Note
that IDi,Ki are selected by S , and Z can not distinguish
whether a is generated in the real world or in the ideal
world due to the property of CCA-secure encryption.
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Simulating the case that the reader is corrupted and the
tag is not corrupted.
A corrupts the reader in the real world and obtains the secret
internal state of the reader. However, the simulator S cannot gets
the internal state of the corrupted tag. The simulation is as follows:
• S corrupts a reader in the ideal world. Then S can
get a = Encpk(KS ||KM ) from the corrupted reader.
Because S can get sk from FCRS, S can decrypt a to
get KS and KM . S uses KS and KM as input to the
ideal functionality later.
• S simulates tag’s response by computing c, d as if it is
generated by A in the real world execution.
• Finally, S sends the reader’s identifier of KS and KM
to FRMA which outputs the result to environment Z .
Because S can extract the same KS , KM used in protocol
execution in the real world, Z will receive the same result
as in the real world.
Simulating the case that the tag is corrupted and the reader
is not corrupted.
A corrupts the tag in the real world and gets the secret internal
state of the tag. The simulation is as follows:
• S simulates the reader’s random challenge a by selecting
KS and KM on its own.
• S can get c = EncKP (IDi||Ki||a||b) and d =
Encpk(a) due to A’s corruption against the reader. S
decrypts d to get a, and then decrypts a to get KS . Using
KS , S can decrypts c to get IDi and Ki.
• Finally, S sends the tag’s identifier of IDi and Ki to
FRMA which outputs the result to environment Z .
Tag corrupted by the real world adversaryA encrypts the same
challenge a received from the reader and give back the same a
obtained from the reader. Thus, the message a that the simulator
in the ideal world can decrypt from d which is the same message
that S computed in the first round, which bears no information
about the real values of KS and KM .
Simulating the case that both the reader and the tag are
corrupted.
The simulation is straightforward since S can extract all the
identifiers of the reader and the tag.
Thanks to the CCA-secure encryption scheme with errorless
decryption and extractability of the identifiers of the reader and the
tag, Z can not distinguish whether it interacts with A in the real
world or S in the ideal world, we thus claim the above theorem.
Theorem 3. Based on the existence of CCA secure encryption,
two Protocols for key update in Fig.5 and Fig.7 UC realize
FKeyUpdate.
Let A be an adversary that interacts with parties running the
protocol in theFCert-hybrid model. We construct an ideal-process
adversary (simulator) S such that the view of any environment Z
from an interaction with A and sba is distributed identically to its
view of an interaction with S in the ideal process for FKeyUpdate.
(1) Security Proof of the protocol based on MAC: Whenever
A corrupts a reader or a tag, S corrupts the same reader and tag
the ideal process, and provides its internalA with the internal state
of the corrupted party. Because the protocol maintains no secret
state at any time, so the simulation is straightforward without Z’s
distinguishability.
Because this protocol shares the same session ID sid with
piRMA, S can easily extract b′. As K ′P is transferred in plaintext,
S can compute the same MAC e = MACKi(b′,K ′P ) as if it is
generated in the real world.
(2) Security Proof of the protocol based on certification: In
our protocol, reader and tag use FCert to do the authentication for
public key update. This extraction of reader’s identifiers is easy
for S to do because A works in the FCert-hybrid model, and any
message sent by A to FCert is seen by S during the simulation.
Simulating the reader. When an uncorrupted reader is acti-
vated with input (KeyUpdate, sid,K ′P ), S obtains the new pub-
lic key from FCert. Then, S simulates for the reader’s interaction
with FCert:
• S sends to its internal A the message
(Sign, (R, sid), (K ′P , Ti)) from FCert, and obtains a
signature sig.
• Next, S sends internal A the message (sid,R,K ′P , sig),
which is sent from the reader to the tag.
• If the reader is corrupted, then what S can do is to simulate
A for the interaction with FCert. Whenever a corrupted
reader sends a message (Sign, sid′,K ′P ) to FCert, S
responds with (Sign, sid′′,m′′) to that reader, obtains a
signature sig′, and sends (Signature, sid′′,m′′, sig′′)
to the reader.
Simulating the tag. When a reader R delivers a message
(sid, reader,K ′P , sig) to an tag Ti, S first simulates tag’s
interaction (via A) with FCert:
• Send (Verify, sid′ = (R, sid),m′ = (m,Ti), sig) to
A (that is, if the reader is corrupted, or m′ was signed in
the past but with a signature different from sig) then send
this message to reader R, and record the response of R.
• FCert would instruct it to output
(Verified, sid′, (K ′P , Ti), sig, f = 1) to the tag
Ti, and then deliver the message (NewKey, sid,K ′P )
which was sent in the ideal process from FKeyUpdate to
the tag Ti.
It is straightforward to verify that the simulation is perfect.
That is, for any environment Z and A, it holds that Z’s view of
an interaction with S and FCert is distributed identically to its
view of an interaction with parties running the protocol as in the
FCert-hybrid model.
5.1 On the practice of our scheme
Here, we discuss about the practical issue of implementing our
UC secure framework for RFID tags. We summarized the charac-
teristics of RFID, both active and passive, in the following table.
active tag passive tag
Singal yes no
Implementation cost higher lower
Battery yes no
Computation ability Yes lower
Cryptographic function public key symmetric key
Our UC secure mutual authentication scheme can only be ap-
plied to active tags according to requirement of public key encryp-
tion. Passive tags are generally smaller than active tags, and will
therefore physically fit on a smaller surface area. As with active
tags, many new capabilities have been developed for passive tags
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in recent years. For the implementation of our UC protocol, we can
applied the schemes using in [19] which is a set of new, efficient,
universally composable two-party protocols for evaluating reactive
arithmetic circuits modulo n, where n is a safe RSA modulus of
unknown factorization. For each protocol with s be the security
parameter, we counted the number of exponentiations with an
exponent of at least s bits. We can evaluate the computational to do
the exponentiation modulo which is UC secure. It requires about
(90·s+200·lnn)exp.n+(66·s+40.5·lnn)exp.n2, where exp.n
is an exponentiation modulo on a tag or reader. Faster operations
such as multiplications and divisions can be ignored compared to
exponentiation modulo.
6 ARGUMENTS ON UC AND ZK-PRIVACY
In section, we make a comparison of the ZK-privacy model pro-
posed by Deng et al. [1]. We notice that if any tagTi has no ability
to create fresh randomness after being corrupted, considering the
privacy of tags which have been corrupted is useless in practice.
The parties and sets in ZK-privacy model are described as follows.
• O is a set of oracles consisting SendTag, SendReader,
and CorruptTag oracles.
• B is a "blinder", a special oracle which allows messages
to be sent and received, but does not allow corruption.
• C is the set of clean tags, i.e., tags which are never
been corrupted. viewA consists of (1)all transcripts of
communication between A and the oracles in O, (2)the
pair (b, T , C), and (3)a poly(k)-bit string outstr which is
outputted by A.
Zero Knowledge Privacy: An RFID scheme is zero-knowledge
private if for any PPT adversary A and distinguisher D, there
exists a simulator S s.t. the following is negligible in k.
AdvZKPD,A,S(k, l, σ) :=
|Pr[D(Expzkp−advA (k, l, σ;ωSetup, ωA, ωS);ωD) = 1]
− |Pr[D(Expzkp−simA (k, l, σ;ωSetup, ωA, ωS);ωD) = 1],
(2)
where l = poly(k) and the probability is taken over random coins
ωSetup, ωA, ωS , ωg , ωD used by Setup(), adversaryA, simulator
S , the algorithm choosing g, and distinguisher D respectively.
Observation. In the second stage, both adversary A2 and simula-
tor S2 are limited not to have any access to C−{Tig}. If adversary
is allowed to have access, it should be a blind access, otherwise,
adversary can corrupt all the rest of clean tags in C − {Tig}.
However, if it is blind access, selecting g has no meaning. Note
that selecting g here means that if the view of communication
between reader and a clean tag Tj is distinguishable to that of
communication between reader and a clean tag Tk 6= Tj , the
simulator must be able to guess g correctly and simulate Tig
accordingly. However, as there is no information on g passed to
simulator, thus the only way to satisfy ZKP is that to require that:
the view of communication between reader and any clean tag is
indistinguishable to that between reader and any other clean tag.
We disassemble ZKP into two notions: simulatable zero
knowledge (simulatable ZK) and anonymous zero knowledge
(anonymous ZK).
• Intuitively, simulatable ZK is an adaptation of original
zero knowledge notion where it only guarantees that the
view is simulatable using public information. It guarantees
the deniability, i.e., the communication transcript can not
be used to ensure a third party that a communication
between a tag and a reader has been taken place. But it
does not put any restriction on public information, which
means that the public information can still contain some
information to identify the tags from the view.
• Anonymous ZK is a notion which guarantees that no one
can guess the identity of a clean tag among a set of clean
tags by communicating blindly with the particular clean
tag and/or by corrupting other tags outside the set of clean
tags.
We provide the experiment of simulatable zero-knowledge as
follows:
Experiment Expsimzk−advA=(A1,A2) (k, `, δ)
1) g ← $[1, δ]
2) (T , R, para)← Setup (k, `)
3) (C, st)← AO1 (T , R, para)
C = {Ti1 , . . . , Tiδ} ⊆ T , T̂ := T − C
4) viewA ← AO2
(
g, T̂ ,B (Tig) , R, st).
5) output (g, viewA)
Fig. 9. ZK experiment for adversary
Experiment Expsimzk−simS=(S1,S2) (k, `, δ)
1) g ← $[1, δ]
2) (T , R, para)← Setup (k, `)
3) (C, st)← SO1 (T , R, para),
C = {Ti1 , . . . , Tiδ} ⊆ T , T̂ := T − C
4) viewS ← SO2
(
g, T̂ , R, st
)
5) output (g, viewS)
Fig. 10. ZK experiment for simulator
The main difference of simulatable ZKP experiments from
original ZKP experiments is that in the second stage both the
adversary and simulator receive the random value g.
Simulatable Zero Knowledge(simul− zk) An RFID scheme
is simulatable zero-knowledge if for any PPT adversary A and
distinguisher D, there exists a simulator S s.t. the following is
negligible in k.
AdvsimzkD,A,S(k, `, δ):=∣∣∣∣Pr [D (Expsimzk−advA=(A1,A2) (k, `, δ;ωSetup, ωA, ωg) ;ωD) = 1]
− Pr
[
D
(
Expsimzk−simS=(S1,S2) (k, `, δ;ωSetup, ωS , ωg) ;ωD
)
= 1
]∣∣∣∣,
(3)
where ` = poly(k) and the probability is taken over random
coins ωSetup, ωA, ωS , ωg , ωD used by Setup(·), adversary
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A, simulator S , the algorithm choosing g, and distinguisher D
respectively.
Anonymous Zero Knowledge(Anou− zk) An RFID system
is said to be anonymous zero knowledge if the advantage of
adversary defined as follows is negligible for any PPT adversary.
Experiment Expanon−zkA:=(A1,A2) (k, `, δ)
1) g ← $[1, δ]
2) (T , R, para)← Setup (k, `)
3) (C, st) ← AO1 (T , R, para), C = {Ti1 , . . . , Tiδ} ⊆ T ,
T̂ := T − C
4) g′ ← AO2
(
T̂ ,B (Tig) , R, st)
5) if g′ = g output 1, otherwise output 0.
The advantage of the adversary can be defined as follows:
Advanon−zkA (k, `, δ)
:=
∣∣∣∣Pr[Expanon−zkA:=(A1,A2) (k, `, δ) = 1]− 1δ
∣∣∣∣ (4)
Theorem 4. Simulatable ZK + Anonymous ZK ⇒ ZKP
We will prove the theorem by contradiction by showing that
if ZKP is not satisfied but simulatable ZK is satisfied, then we
can construct an adversary for breaking anonymous ZK.
Proof. The assumptions and preliminaries used in our proof are
provided as following:
• Let Azkp=(Azkp1 ,Azkp2 ) and Dzkp denote respectively the
adversary and distinguisher of ZKP such that for all simu-
lator Ŝ , the following holds. AdvzkpDzkp,Azkp,Ŝ(k, `, δ) > ,
where  is non-negligible.
• Let Asimzk2 denotes a copy of Azkp2 with ad-
ditional dummy input interface for g. From
the definition of simulatable ZK, we can treat
Asimzk:=(Asimzk1 (=Azkp1 ),Asimzk2 ) as an adversary of sim-
ulatable ZK. And since we assume that the simulatable
ZK is satisfied, we can assume to have a simulator
S:=(S1,S2) such that Advsimul−zkD,Asimzk,S(k, `, δ) < φ holds
for any distinguisher D, where φ is negligible in k.
W.l.o.g., we assume (2k − 1)φ < .
We construct an adversary of anonymous ZK A′=(A′1,A′2) as
follows: A′1:=(Asimzk1 ,S1), A′2 := (Dzkp,Asimzk2 ,S2).
Then procedure of the adversary and simulator can be summa-
rized as follows:
1) We run A′1 and at the end of the run, we retrieve states
stA, stS from Asimzk1 and S1 respectively, and access to
T̂ ,B (Tig) , R.
• Note that since the simulatable ZK is satisfied and
viewA contains the pair (T̂ , C), Asimzk1 and S1
are guaranteed to output the same set of clean tags
C.
2) For g = 1 to δ, we run the following steps.
a) We run Asimzk2 and S2 with the same input g and
get viewA, viewS, as results of Expsimzk−advA ,
Expsimzk−simS respectively.
• All oracle queries from Asimzk2 and S2 are
forwarded toO and all answers are forwarded
back to Asimzk2 and S2 accordingly.
b) We run Dzkp with input viewA and
randomly chosen random tapes for N times.
Then, We run Dzkp with input viewS,
and randomly chosen random tapes for
N times. Let padv(g)=
#{Dzkp(viewA)=1}
N ,
psim(g)=
#{Dzkp(viewS)=1}
N .
At the end, we output g such that |padv(g) − psim(g)| is the
smallest.
• Using splitting lemma, with probability 12 , we can ran-
domly choose random coins ω′Setup, ω
′
I , ω
′
A, ω
′
S , ω
′
g such
that for any random coin of distinguisher ωD , the follow-
ing holds:
AdvzkpDzkp,Azkp,Ŝ(k, `, δ;ω
′
Setup, ω
′
I , ω
′
A, ω
′
S , ω
′
g, ωD) >

2
(5)
Let we choose such random coins at the beginning.
• Note that if g = g, then padv(g) and psim(g) are the
estimated values of the probability as follows:
Pr
[
D
(
Expsimzk−advA
(
k, `, δ;ω′Setup, ω
′
A, ω
′
g
)
;ωD
)
= 1
]
and
Pr
[
D
(
Expsimzk−simS
(
k, `, δ;ω′Setup, ω
′
A, ω
′
g
)
;ωD
)
= 1
]
,
respectively.
Otherwise, if g 6= g, they are those of:
Pr
[
D
(
Expzkp−advA
(
k, `, δ;ω′Setup, ω
′
A, ω
′
g
)
;ωD
)
=1
]
and Pr
[
D
(
Expzkp−simS
(
k, `, δ;ω′Setup, ω
′
A, ω
′
g
)
;ωD
)
= 1
]
.
• Using Chernoff Bound, we can estimate the lower bound
of N so that we can achieve high-precision estimations so
that |padv(g) − psim(g)| for any g 6= g is always larger
than |padv(g)− psim(g)| for g = g with high probability.
Theorem 5. ZKP⇒ Simulatable ZK + AnonymousZK
Proof. It is easy to see that ZKP⇒ Simulatable ZK holds. Thus,
it is sufficient for us to show that any adversary A = (A1,A2)
breaking anonymous ZK can be transform into an adversary
Azkp = (Azkp1 ,Azkp2 ) and a distinguisherD which can distinguish
between Expzkp−advA and Exp
zkp−sim
S for any simulator S .
Let Azkp1 = A1 and Azkp2 = A2. Note that Azkp2 can out-
put g (through outstr) with non-negligible advantage from1/δ.
However, since simulator does not get any information on g,
information theoreticaly, simulator can only output the same g
with probability 1/δ.
Theorem 6. IDEALFRRMA ≈ EXECpiRRMA ⇒ piRRMA is ZKP.
Proof. An environment can ask the adversary to always deliver
the communication message between the reader and the tags, and
the environment itself is the one who setup the initial data on the
tags and the reader. Thus, if such simulator S does not exist, the
environment can easily distinguish between ideal process and real
process, contradicting the assumption that protocol piRRMA UC-
realizes FRRMA.
Since FRRMA does not give S any information on any party
or interaction between parties, S must be able to simulate the
communication between the reader and the tag without any infor-
mation from the tag or reader.
We can show that a UC simulator SUC in the ideal process
with functionality FRRMA can be used to construct the simulator
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Ssimzk to prove simulatable ZK. Let Asimzk=(Asimzk1 ,Asimzk2 )
be an adversary in Expsimzk−advAsimzk=(Asimzk1 ,Asimzk2 ). We can constructSsimzk=(Ssimzk1 ,Ssimzk2 ) as follows : Ssimzk1 = Asimzk1 , Ssimzk2 =
(Asimzk2 ,SUC). Remind that from the proposition at the previous
slide, SUC must be able to simulate any tag requested by the
environment, even without any prior information on the tags and
the reader. Therefore, we can use SUC to simulate the blind access
to Tig for Asimzk2 .
Assume that piRRMA is not anonymous ZK. We show the con-
struction of an environment Z which distinguishes ideal process
and the real process using adversary of anonymous ZKAanonZK.Z
uses AanonZK as subroutine. First, Z chooses the random value g
and Z setups the reader and the tags. All oracle queries from
AanonZK are forwarded to the tags and the reader, and all the
answers are forwarded back to AanonZK. Then, Z requests the
(UC) adversary to act as the blinder B of Tig , i.e., deliver any
query oracle to Tig , and report the answer from Tig .
Notice that since the real process is exactly the same as the
experiment of anonymous ZK,AanonZK will correctly guess g with
non-negligible probability. However, in the ideal process, since the
simulator (ideal process adversary) must simulate the blind access
to Tig independently without any related information to Tig ,
information theoretically, AanonZK can not distinguish whether it
is quering Tig or another tag. Thus, in ideal process, AanonZK can
only correctly guess g with probability 1/δ.
7 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the security definitions of RFID
mutual authentication protocols under the UC framework and
analyzed the impossibility of implementing a UC secure mutual
authentication protocol in the plain model. Due to the extractabil-
ity requirement, the design of a UC secure RFID mutual authen-
tication protocol turns out to be challenging. We realized that the
PKI involving trusted third parties is a necessary condition and that
additional information should be sent to guarantee the extractabil-
ity. The security of RFID mutual authentication and authenticated
key update protocols are proved strictly under the UC framework.
We also provided formal analysis to bridge ZK-privacy and UC
secure framework, which shows that UC-framework implies ZK-
privacy. The cryptographic primitives in the proposed UC secure
protocols may be too costly to be incorporated into the standard
low-cost RFID tags such as EPC Gen 2 tags.ãA˘A˘Nonetheless, we
believe that high-end RFID tags can implement the cryptographic
components for the UC-security.
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